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SOCIAL INFORMATION, SOCIAL
POLICY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
NORMAN BRADBURN
t is a great honor to be invited to give the first Rudolph Wildenmann lecture. Prof.
Wildenmann was a leader in the development of empirical social science in Germany,
particularly in the study of political behavior and of elections. He was also a great sup-
porter of innovative methodologies and instrumental in the founding of ZUMA. It is in
his spirit and, I hope, a fitting honor to his memory that I have chosen to speak about a
topic that lies at the intersection of social science, politics, and concerns for data.
In his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention in August, President
Clinton cited 27 social and economic facts about the nation. These facts ranged over a
great variety of topics from better known indicators such as the unemployment and infla-
tion rates to lesser known facts about the economy (for example, a 4.4 million increase
in home ownership, 15 million persons pay less income tax) to social conditions (for
example, 1.8 million fewer persons on welfare, 40 million persons with more pension
security) to crime (for example, 100,000 more police on the streets, 60,000 fewer
persons could get handguns) to health (for example, the life expectancy of AIDS patients
doubled, 12 million families took advantage of new family and medical leave
opportunities). Of course, these facts are put forth as an argument for the effectiveness of
the policies of the Clinton administration.
The use of data for the formulation and evaluation of public policy and the contribution
that social scientists can make to the improvement in that use are the subjects of my talk
today. The discussion is naturally influenced by own experiences, principally in the area
of large-scale sample surveys for governmental agencies, and as a member of the Com-
mittee on National Statistics at the National Research Council, a quasi-public body
whose mission is the improvement of the U.S. federal statistical system. I will discuss
the problems in the context of the uses of information in a democratic society, and I hope
that my thoughts and conclusions will be widely applicable to most democratic societies,
but inevitably, my reflections draw most heavily on the situation in the United States.
I
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The framing of information about Society
The framing of information affects its perceived relevance to policy considerations. Con-
sider, for example, data about carbon dioxide. Among other things, carbon dioxide is a
product that is manufactured, and statistics on its production used to be available as part
of economic statistics. We found among economic statistics the fact that there were
1,014,000 short tons of carbon dioxide (liquid, gas and solid) manufactured in the
United Sates in 1968. Other facts about carbon dioxide, as, for example, those relating
to its chemical properties and the way it is utilised in photosynthesis, would not
ordinarily be considered social information.
But, of course, things are not so simple. Natural scientists have raised the possibility that
the size of the world's population and their use of natural resources, in particular the
burning of fuels like coal and wood and the destruction of large tracts of forested land,
will lead to an increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere which,
in turn, produces a "greenhouse effect." The most serious consequence of this effect will
be global warming, that is an increase in the average temperature through the world,
with attendant changes in agricultural productivity in many parts of the world and in the
distributions of peoples. The extent to which there is a trend toward global warming
and, if so, whether it is a product of man's activities or of natural cyclical forces is still
controversial, but the probability is sufficiently large that governments are beginning to
take actions to address the problem. Thus there was a need for new kinds of data that are
relevant to the newly framed problem. Now we find that data on carbon dioxide
emissions are available. For example, the U.S. produced 5.26 tC/capita or about 17% of
the world's emissions in 1985.
This example was chosen to make a point central to my argument. The point concerns
the relativity of the classification of data, indeed the very definition of what constitutes
data. Whether or not things are viewed as "data" and worthy of being measured, lies in
the question being asked, not in the thing itself. Facts about carbon dioxide become data
because someone asks questions about this chemical substance and has been able to con-
vince someone else to allocate the resources necessary to collect information, to store it a
manner that it can be accessed by those who are trying to answer the questions and, in
fact, to make it available to those asking question about carbon dioxide. Facts become
"policy-relevant data" when someone starts asking questions about policies to deal with
a phenomenon such as the "greenhouse effect" and perceives that the data are needed to
answer the policy relevant questions.
If we take the position that "facts" do not become "data" until they are framed by ques-
tions, then we naturally ask: how does society decide what data to collect in order to
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meet its policy and other information needs? There are, I believe, three main
mechanisms by which decisions are made about the ongoing collection of data about
society. They are: first, governments, second, markets, and third, social scientists.
Governments
Governments, be they local, regional or national, have responsibilities for the common
well-being of society. While the exact responsibilities vary from nation to nation, gov-
ernments commonly have some responsibilities for such things as defense, maintenance
of law and order, education, transportation, communications, natural resources, health,
social services and various aspects of the economy. In order to carry out their respon-
sibilities, they need information on an ongoing basis about their respective areas, and
part of their budget will be devoted to providing this information for their own needs.
Fulfilling these needs is commonly the task of governmental statistical agencies,
although governments may not rely entirely on their official statistical systems for
relevant information. Statistical systems vary considerable across nations in the way they
are organized. Some, such as Canada and many European countries, have statistical
functions centralized in a central statistical office, while others, notably the United
States, have a very decentralized system with different governmental agencies having
their own statistical bureaus, the entire system being loosely coordinated by a small
central office located in the Office of the President. As I understand the German system,
it would fall somewhere between a highly centralized system, like Canada's, and a
completely decentralized system, like that of the United States.
There is a loose correlation between the scope of governmental responsibilities and the
demand for data, but the proper relationship between the responsibility to collect data
about different aspects of society and the responsibilities of governmental agencies has
been a source of continual disagreement. From the beginning of the United States, there
has been a conflict between those who believe that the government should only collect
data that is of direct relevance to its mission and others who argue for a larger
conception. They would have the government collect data on aspects of society that may
be of broad interest to citizens or legislators, but not necessarily of immediate use.
This argument was raised in debates about the content of the first U.S. census in 1790.
Minimalists argued that the Census should only enumerate the population because the
purpose of the census was only to establish the number of people for apportionment and
tax purposes. Others, most notably James Madison, one of the most farseeing of the
Founding Fathers, argued for extending the census "so as to embrace some other objects
besides the bare enumeration of the inhabitants." He argued for collecting information
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about what we would now consider social and demographic characteristics of individuals
and economic conditions. Although Madison lost the argument in the first census, later
censuses, beginning in the mid-19th Century expanded the number of topics covered in
the decennial census.
The argument is still not entirely dead, and there is strong sentiment in the current Con-
gress for eliminating the so-called long form on the next census in the year 2000. The
long form is a detailed questionnaire that is given to every sixth household and asks in
considerable detail about social, economic and housing characteristics of the American
population.
The output of the governmental statistical system constitutes what might be called
"official statistics." Official statistics have a special status in that they are relied upon for
the formulation and evaluation of governmental policies. In many cases they are also
used in models that simulate the effects of policy alternatives. In the United States there
are important budget, tax, social welfare and energy models that are widely used by
executive branch government departments and by the Congressional Budget Office to
model the effects of proposed changes in governmental programs. It is difficult to
overestimate the importance of these models and the statistical base that provides the
numbers going into the models. As one recent study of microsimulation modeling put it:
"Today, whatever the policy issue, "the numbers" play a prominent role. Indeed, in
Washington...neither top administration officials nor members of Congress will move
very far to develop legislation in the absence of detailed estimates of the cost and other
effects of the proposed changes. They treat the estimates not only as informative but
often, in the case of costs, as binding." (Citro/Hanushek 1991, p.24).
Because of the uses to which official statistics are put, they should be of the highest
quality. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. While government officials may rely
heavily on "the numbers", they typically have little understanding or interest in how they
are collected or in such technical matters as sampling and measurement error. In times of
tight budgets, money for statistical agencies, and particularly for research in method im-
provement, is frequently reduced without regard to its effect on important data series
that provide the basis for governmental decision making or the administration of existing
programs. During the initial years of the Reagan administration, statistical budgets were
cut severely, partly on the grounds that the scope of government was going to be reduced
and that much of the data collected by governmental agencies would not be needed,
thereby echoing the conservative views of an earlier age. The Office of Management and
Budget estimates that spending on statistics was reduced by 13% in real terms between
1980 and 1988. While there was an effort during the Bush administration, led by Prof.
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Michael Boskin of Stanford University, to restore funds, particularly for the
improvement of economic statistics, this initiative has only been partially successful and
current levels of support are still below those in 1980 in real terms.
Errors in official statistics can have dramatic consequences for policy. One of the most
controversial statistics in the U.S. is a basic one that one would not ordinarily think of as
subject to error, that is, the estimate of the size of the total population from the decennial
census. For many years, it has been known that the census undercounts the population by
about 2% overall, but undercounts some groups, such as black men aged 18-24 by as
much as 25%. While the size of the undercount is reliably known for the total population
and for some of the major subgroups, the undercount for smaller areas such as states or
cities, is not precisely known. By using sampling methods, the Census Bureau can esti-
mate the undercount for important areas, such as states or large cities, and use these esti-
mates to adjust the totals to make them more accurate.
Social scientists have played a major role in developing techniques to measure the
undercount and in devising methods to adjust census counts to be more accurate. While
in previous decades, there was considerable disagreement among the scientists about the
appropriate methods for adjustment, there has recently been a convergence of views and
a near consensus that there are appropriate methods that can make an adjusted count
more accurate. A recent report by a Panel of the National Academy of Sciences (Steffey/
Bradburn 1994) that I chaired recommended a census in the year 2000 that incorporates
such adjustment methods.
The argument, however, is much more than a technical one. There are two politically im-
portant outcomes of the census that are affected by adjustment. One affects the distribu-
tion of political power, that is, the number of seats in Congress which are allocated to
different states in the House of Representatives. The other affects the distribution of
money, that is, the amount of money distributed to states by the federal government
according to formulae based on population. When the distribution of power and money
are affected by numbers, it is unlikely that decisions will be made purely on technical
grounds, but rather that political forces will be fully engaged in the decision. While the
final outcome of the debate is still uncertain, the preliminary proposal of the Census
Bureau to use sampling to improve the census count and adjust the counts in accordance
with sample data, as has been recommended by numerous technical groups, has been
rejected by Congress. If the Republicans continue to control Congress, it is likely that
the census in the year 2000 will be done without sampling or adjustments for the
undercount.
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Another statistic that has recently received a lot of attention because of alleged mis-
measurement is the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI is the principal measure of in-
flation. It is used in many unionized wage agreements to adjust wages in periods
between contract negotiations. It is used to adjust many government payment levels like
old-age pension benefits and to adjust income tax brackets. Because so many payments
are tied to the actual level of the CPI and because it is used as a principal economic
indicator by bankers and the financial markets, it can affect many aspects of the economy
such as interest rates, stock market prices and the federal deficit.
For a number of years experts in economic statistics have known that the CPI overstated
inflation by some unknown, but non-trivial amount. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, the
government agency that is responsible for the data base that is used to calculate the CPI,
had been planning for years to start a program of research to revise the CPI and the sur-
veys which provide the data that are used to calculate it. The Bureau's plans for an
orderly program of research were interrupted by a casual comment from the Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board during testimony before Congress. He noted that the CPI
overstated inflation with the result that the federal deficit was larger than it would be if
the CPI properly measured inflation. He estimated that the CPI overstated inflation by
about 1 percentage point (or by 33% on the current reported rate of about 3%) and that
this overestimate added about $6 billion per year to the federal deficit through a
combination of increased payments in benefits and reduced tax revenues.
The Chairman's statement immediately became big news and politicians began to bring
pressure on the BLS to immediately adjust their numbers downward by 1 percentage
point. Much to the Bureau's credit, the Commissioner of Labor Statistics resisted this
pressure and refused to do any arbitrary adjustments in spite of dire warnings from the
Mr. Gingrich, the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Congress did appoint a panel
of distinguished economists to review the information available from past research and,
if possible, make a consensus recommendation about the degree of overstatement in the
present CPI that might be used as an adjustment factor in formulae using the CPI. They
are supposed to report by the end of the year. In the meantime, the BLS is proceeding
with its research program and plans to introduce a revised CPI in a few years. Ironically,
the BLS had submitted a budget request a number of years ago to start a major revision
of the CPI, but it was turned down. If the request had been granted when it was
requested, the revisions would have been completed by the time the politicians took up
the cry for immediate change.
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Market
A second source of social data is the private marketplace. While much of data collected
in the private sector is proprietary, there are notable exceptions. The most widespread is
information about financial markets such as the well-known stock and bond market
indices and the prices of individual securities traded in the market. The provision of this
type of information is made possible by the sale of individual copies of newspapers and
magazines, and by advertising.
Virtually no opinion data are provided by official statistics. "Softer" data about social
and political attitudes and public opinion about policy issues of the day are almost
entirely provided by the private market, particularly the mass media. Since the early
days of polling, newspapers, magazines, and later, TV networks, were the principal
founders of the "public" opinion polls, as contrasted with private polling that is done for
candidates, political parties or interest groups. In the U.S. the large national newspapers
and news magazines together with the electronic media, produce a large proportion of
the public polls that are related to policy issues. During election campaigns, the amount
of survey data that fills the media can be staggering.
With the development of computer networks, most notably the Internet, the provision of
information through commercial data bases containing both statistical and other infor-
mation, has become economically viable. These data bases may contain government
data, repackaged to make them more accessible or "user friendly", data previously
published but difficult to access and even proprietary data. The ability to provide access
to large amounts of data at low cost promises to make this an explosive market. As firms
are able to capture the value of the data by selling access to it, we can expect not only an
increase in data bases of data collected for other purposes, but also more data series that
have been collected specifically to supply a broad market for social information.
Social Sciences
Social scientists play a distinctive but somewhat different role in the provision of social
data. Trained social scientists, of course, are a part of the labor force that is employed by
governmental statistical agencies and private survey research firms, although not all peo-
ple working in these organizations are trained social scientists. But the more important
roles for social scientists are twofold: First, they play a vital role in defining the
questions that are important to ask, and thus, to collect data about; and, second, as I don't
need to tell this audience, they play the major role in developing measurement and
analytic methods and in setting the standards for the quality of data collection.
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There are several ways that social scientists contribute to defining the questions that are
asked and the data to be collected. First, social science theories, particularly economic
theories, provide the framework for understanding social and economic systems.
Theories specify the variables that are of interest in policy applications, and thus,
indicate the types of data that are necessary to collect. This process may be more or less
formal and self-conscious. When policy analysts use simulation models, the types of data
needed are spelled out in some detail and the lack of some type of data may then become
clear. Models play a useful role in specifying data needs and rationalizing the data
collection agendas of government agencies. For example. when monetary theories of
inflation were popular, interest in different ways to measure the money supply grew and
there was a lively debate about the meaning of different measures such a M1, M2, M3,
etc. which measured different types of time deposits and money instruments that were
cash equivalents.
Social scientists also play a role in clarifying important measures of their concepts and
suggesting better ways to conceptualize and measure them. This is one of the tasks that
the Committee on National Statistics at the National Academy of Sciences undertakes.
For example, a panel of economists and other social scientists examined in detail the
way in which international trade data are collected and analyzed to produce statistics on
the U.S. balance of trade. They concluded that the Commerce Department was using
obsolete methods of assigning transactions to domestic or foreign firms and that they
failed to distinguish properly foreign based branches of US firms and US based branches
of foreign firms. By treating transactions among branches of these types of firms both
within and between countries incorrectly, the balance of trade figures were quite
misleading. With the new way of computing the trade balance, the US trade deficit was
much lower and in some years it was actually in surplus, when the government was
reporting it in deficit. Much of the US trade policy is driven by the data on the balance
of trade with different countries, notably Japan and the EU, If the definition and
measurement of the trade balance is faulty, it will lead to serious policy errors.
One could list many other data series that are the result of social scientific theories about
significant social and economic processes such as the national economic accounts, the
unemployment rate, population growth rates, teenage pregnancy rates, etc.
The development of the idea of social indicators some years ago represents a different
approach to the use of social data related to social policy. Rather than specify a
theoretical view of social functioning, these social scientists investigate the goals of
society, look at the currently available data, and point to those areas where adequate data
do not exist. This approach is well exemplified by Albert Biderman's paper in one of the
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first volumes on Social Indicators, edited by Raymond Bauer (Bauer, 1969). Biderman
analyzed the social goals discussed in the 1960 Report of the President's Commission on
National Goals and the 30 years earlier Report of President Hoover's Committee on
Recent Social Trends. He found that there was considerable overlap in the goals
discussed in the two reports, but that there was a substantial lack of relevant data for the
goals in both reports. The identification of these lacks led to the development of new
data, most notably the development of good data on income and program participation
that tracked more clearly the receipt of transfer payments through governmental
programs. This is the approach that has been followed in Germany by the social
indicators project centered here in Mannheim.
While the enthusiasm for social indicators as an important tool for evaluating
government success that was characteristic of its early days has cooled, serious work has
continued, more steadily in Germany than in America. Social scientists at the University
of Mannheim and ZUMA have made important contributions to that work and continue
to do so. There is some indication of a revival of interest in social indicators in the
United States and in the OECD, which has a large project on standardizing education
indicators.
It is interesting to speculate on the reasons for the waxing and waning of interest in
social indicators. It is difficult today to convey the extraordinary excitement that the idea
of social indicators aroused when they were first proposed. In the U.S. the enthusiasm in
the 1960's was so great that it could almost be characterized as a social movement. The
idea of social indicators was regarded by its supporters as an extension of rationality to
societal functioning. That is, societies were viewed as having general goals that they are
trying to achieve and as having different means available to achieve these goals. The
application of thought and planning can illuminate the relative value of the different
means, so that society's members can choose the best means, however, defined, to
achieve the goals.
The interest in social indicators was an extension of the process of rationalization of life
that has been going on with varying degrees of speed in the Western world since at least
the eighteenth century. What was new was not the idea of using data to monitor progress
toward goal accomplishment, but the radical altering of the level at which this exercise
was being attempted. Attention turned from the measurement of the performance of mid-
dle-level aggregates, such as firms, hospitals, sectors of the economy, etc., to the meas-
urement of the performance of the society itself. Social scientists were prominent in the
social indicators movement and were able to secure government positions that allowed
them to begin to put their ideas into practice.
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The change in the level at which questions of means-ends relationships were being
asked turned out to be more radical that it appeared at first. At smaller levels of
organization, such as those of a business firm or school system, the goals are, if not
single, at least few in number, and the criteria by which the possible means for achieving
the goals are to be evaluated are also fairly clear. Furthermore, the decision processes for
the allocation of resources to those organizations lie outside the organizations, for
example, decisions are made by the market, governmental appropriations or
philanthropic endeavors, rather than by the activity of the organization itself.
Thus, it is possible to be "rational" about the means without bringing into question the
relative value of the goals of the enterprise.
In a democratic society, however, one must deal with different goals whose relative
ordering is not clearly agreed upon or necessarily even constant over time. In addition,
the arena in which the relative importance of the goals is decided is the same one in
which the means for reaching the goals are decided upon, namely, the political one.
Thus, the extension of the concept of social indicators to the level of societal decisions,
that is the use of social data to answer questions systematically about the achievement of
societal goals, will inevitably lead to an increased politicization of the collection and use
of social data and, by extension if one is not careful, to the politicization of the social
sciences. Since at the societal level, the questions of means and ends are resolved by the
political process, the participation of social scientists attempting to marshall data to
answer questions "scientifically" about relative means for accomplishing goals cannot be
the same as their participation in lower levels of organization, such as the planning of
training programs, or in evaluating the effectiveness of a medical care program.
The confrontation between the idea of a "social report" that systematically laid out data
about progress toward achieving stated societal goals, as for example, the elimination of
poverty in President Johnson's War on Poverty, and the realities of electoral politics,
made it clear that neither Congress nor the President wanted such a report which could
show failures as well as successes. After three years, the idea of a government report
card on the nation's achievements (or as it turned out lack of them) was laid to rest.
Support for the idea that deep societal conflicts over competing goals could be resolved
by the rational application of social engineering and monitoring by the collection of
systematic indicator data declined drastically.
The retreat from viewing social indicators as a total solution to the problem of evaluating
the political process did not mean that interest in indicators died. It has continued in a
more muted form, and social scientists have continued to play an important role in de-
veloping performance indicators at lower levels of aggregation such as the economy,
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health and education. The important role of social scientists in the development of meas-
ures that can then be used to monitor the effects of social policies is well illustrated by
the development of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). In the
U.S., as in Germany, education is the responsibility of the states, rather than the federal
government. The federal government, however, has a great interest in the quality of
education in the country, and has responsibilities for aspects of social welfare that are
related to education, such as insuring equal opportunity to obtain an education. As a
result of the Supreme Court racial desegregation decision in the early 1950's, the role of
the federal government in education was greatly enlarged.
As early as 1867 a federal Office of Education has been established for statistical pur-
poses. One of its tasks was to report on the progress of education in the United States.
An examination of educational statistics over most of the period since then indicates that
"progress" was defined largely in terms of the educational level of the population rather
than in terms of specific knowledge. The launching of sputnik by the Soviet Union fo-
cused attention on the quality of U.S. scientific and mathematical education. People be-
gan to raise questions beyond how much schooling our youth received and to ask ques-
tions about how good the schooling was in terms of what the graduates of the schools
knew about different subject matters.
The idea of measuring knowledge as an outcome of schools was not an idea that was
congenial to many school administrators or teachers. The strong traditions of local
control of schools and local setting of standards were in opposition to attempts by the
federal government to give anything that looked like a national test or to use measures
that would allow comparison across schools or school districts in terms of the quality of
outcomes.
The development of NAEP was done by a group of social scientists financed by a private
foundation. It took about five years to bring the idea to the point that it could be put in
practice as a national governmental program.
Its development illustrates several important points about the interplay between policy
concerns and data sources. First, some policy entrepreneurial group has to take the lead
in formulating the policy issues that give rise to the demand for the data. In this case
leadership came from both the educational community and from social scientists. They
formed an Exploratory Committee that did the political work necessary to overcome
opposition from those who had something to lose, or, at least thought that they had
something to lose, by the implementation of a nationwide assessment. This Exploratory
Committee was composed of social scientists, educators, politicians, and leading citizens
who drew into their activities people from diverse and important segments of the
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educational system. Membership was crafted to maximize the chances to influence
policies at a variety of political levels--federal, state, and local--that were crucial for
getting cooperation from the school systems.
Second, the technical work of developing measuring instruments and testing the data
collection plan went on simultaneously with the political work. The technical problems
were serious because the assessment design had to be constructed so that it would
measure change in the nation as a whole, but could not be used to measure the accom-
plishments of an individual school or of an individual student. To sell the idea of a
national assessment, it was vital that the testing plan would not allow an assessment at
the state, local or individual school level.
The simultaneous development of the measuring instruments and the political support
for the idea of an assessment was important for the success of the idea. Once support for
the idea of an assessment had been achieved, it had to be executed rapidly before
support eroded. If the Exploratory Committee had waited to begin development of the
measuring instruments until support for the idea of the assessment was high and the
funding secure, the National Assessment would never have gotten off the ground.
The supporters of the National Assessment believed, correctly as it turned out, that the
existence of national data on students' performance would stimulate demand for more
disaggregated data, which in the beginning was viewed as unacceptable. The demand
manifested itself in three major developments. First is the implementation of state level
assessments. The governors of the various states want to have comparable assessments
in their states so that they can compare the achievement of their states with that of
others.
The second is a renewed interest in international comparisons, particularly in science
and mathematics, using a metric that can be linked in some fashion to NAEP measures.
The Third International Math and Science study (TIMS) has received major support
from the United States in order that we can better understand the standards we apply to
our educational system as compared with those of other industrialized nations.
The third development is the renewed interest in finding alternatives to standardized
multiple-choice tests that have become the hallmark of mass testing programs. There
have always been criticisms of multiple-choice test on the grounds that they do not
measure creative problem solving or higher order thinking skills. Some progress is being
made in the development of performance tests, although formidable problems of cost and
reliability have still not been overcome. This is an area where the work of social
scientists is essential for the technical development of the measures.
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Conclusions
In this talk I have briefly discussed some of the issues that confront those who are inter-
ested in the production of data for policy use. I have focused mainly on how decisions
are made about what data to collect and how such data are framed, with particular
emphasis on the role of social scientists in that process.
Social scientists bear a special responsibility for insuring the quality of the data collected
and analyzed for policy purposes. But many social research projects fail not because the
data collection was poor or the analysis was bad, although there are certainly many ex-
ample of such projects. They fail because those asking the questions did not make the
questions clear to those collecting and analyzing the data, and those collecting and ana-
lyzing the data did not understand the political problems facing those who were to be the
ultimate users of the data.
To a considerable extent, we social scientists are responsible for this situation. As the
social sciences have become more "scientific" there has been greater emphasis in gradu-
ate training on the technical scientific aspects of the social science disciplines and less
emphasis, even in some universities to the vanishing point, on the relation of social in-
quiry to social policy. Even in political science, which traditionally has been a field
deeply concerned with public policy, there has been a movement toward formal,
"rational " approaches which stress scientific and theoretical rigor at the expense of
concern for problems of the utilization of social research.
The tension between "scientific" and "policy" research is certainly not new. It was
present in President Hoover's committee in the tension between the University of
Chicago sociologist, W.F.Ogburn, who stood for the scientific spirit in social sciences,
and his colleague, the political scientist Charles Merriam, who had a great appreciation
for the political aspects of social research. Today, the scientific approach, which was in
its early stages in the 1920's, has flowered almost to the exclusion of concern for policy
implications of social research. How we achieve a proper balance between these two
concerns in contemporary social science training is one of our most important unresolved
questions.
The challenge was aptly noted by the authors of the report by the Committee on Recent
Social Trends:
"More widely in the future than in the immediate past, we may expect the growth of
thinking about the meaning of the great masses of social data which we have become so
expert and generous in assembling. Is it possible that there is a radical inconsistency be-
tween the industrious and precise collection of material and the effort to interpret and
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utilize what has been found out? Or, on the contrary, is there compelling urgency that
they be brought together both for the sake of science and of society?... It might be said,
indeed, that while the most recent phase of American development in the social field has
been the recognition of the necessity of fact finding agencies and equipment, and their
actual establishment, the next phase of advancement may find more emphasis upon the
interpretation and synthesis than the last."
More than 60 years have passed since these words were written. Professor Wildenmann
was acutely aware of this tension and exemplified the social scientist who met the chal-
lenge of bridging the two worlds of science and application, data and policy relevant
analysis. We must ask ourselves: Have enough of us risen to that challenge to be able to
declare confidently that we have progressed into "that next phase of advancement?" I am
not confident that we have.
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